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ABSTRACT
Public corporations live in a dynamic and ever-changing business environment. This paper
examines how courts and legislators should choose default arrangements in the corporate area to address
new circumstances. We show that the interests of the shareholders of existing companies would not be
served by adopting those defaults arrangements that public officials view as most likely to be value-
enhancing. Because any charter amendment requires the board￿s initiative, opting out of an inefficient
default arrangement is much more likely to occur when management disfavors the arrangement than
management supports it. We develop a ￿reversible defaults￿ approach that takes into account this
asymmetry. When public officials must choose between two or more default arrangements and face
significant uncertainty as to which one would best serve shareholders, they should err in favor of the
arrangement that is less favorable to managers. Such an approach, we show, would make it most likely
that companies would be ultimately governed by the arrangement that would maximize shareholder value.
Evaluating some of the main choices that state corporate law has made in the past two decades in light
of our proposed approach, we endorse some but question others. The arrangements we examine include
those developed with respect to director liability, state antitakeover statutes, and the range of permitted
defensive tactics.
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bebchuk@law.harvard.eduI. CHOOSING DEFAULTS IN A DYNAMIC BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
This paper focuses on a question that has, in our view, received inadequate attention in 
the literature on corporate law theory and policy:  What approach should guide courts and 
legislators when they choose a default arrangement to govern a new issue confronting publicly 
traded companies?
1  This question is important because such companies often live a long life 
after they go public, and they operate in a dynamic, ever-changing environment.  Courts and 
legislators are therefore often faced with the need to provide default arrangements for 
contingencies that the corporate charter’s original designers either failed to anticipate or to 
consider thoroughly.  In this paper, we provide a theory of optimal corporate-law defaults.  We 
argue that, in choosing default corporate-law arrangements, court and legislators should follow 
what we call the reversible default approach.  We also evaluate, in light of our theory, several 
important choices that state corporate law has made in the last two decades, endorsing some of 
these choices and suggesting changes in others.  
Work on the general considerations that lawmakers should use in designing corporate 
rules has focused on the criteria for deciding whether a given corporate issue should be governed 
by a mandatory or by a default rule, that is, on whether companies should be allowed to opt out 
of the arrangement that the law provides.
2  In contrast, relatively little has been written about the 
general considerations that should determine the choice of default arrangements in the corporate 
                                                 
1 The analysis in this paper focuses on default rules governing publicly-traded companies with 
dispersed ownership. Thus, unless we indicate otherwise, the term “companies” will refer only to public 
companies.  For an analysis of default rules for close corporations, see Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling 
Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216 (1992) 
(discussing specific issues of gap filling with respect to close corporations). 
2 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); Symposium, 





3  This paper focuses on this question and analyzes how such default arrangements should 
be designed.  
The ever-changing nature of the business environment, combined with the long life that 
many publicly traded companies have, requires corporate law to provide often defaults to govern 
new circumstances that have received little or no prior attention from the designers of corporate 
charters.  For example, the development of the market for hostile takeovers in the 1970s and the 
1980s required public officials to provide default rules to govern the new problems and issues 
associated with this new business environment. The choice of default arrangements is thus an 
important question for corporate law policy.   
Our analysis takes into account an important difference between two types of companies 
to which a default rule will apply: companies that will go public in the future (“future IPOs”), 
after the default’s rule adoption, and companies that are already publicly traded at the time the 
new default is adopted (“existing companies”).
4  As we shall show, this distinction is quite 
significant for the optimal design of default rules.  The potential effect of a new default rule on 
                                                 
3 One exception is an earlier work by one of us on which we build here.  See Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1410-13 
(1989) (discussing how to examine corporate law defaults in light of managers’ control over charter 
amendments). Other earlier works which examine the question of corporate defaults from a different 
perspective than ours are Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook 
and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1397-400 (1992) (discussing how to design corporate law defaults 
in light of information-forcing considerations), and Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and 
Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 826-834 (1995) (examining how to design corporate defaults 
in light of network externalities). See also Sharon Hannes, The Determinants and Consequences of 
Corporate Stagnation: Discussion and Reform Proposal, (working paper, Harvard Law School, 2001, on 
file with authors) (suggesting that in certain circumstances, to prevent corporate stagnation, all earlier opt-
out charter provisions by companies be cancelled). 
4 The importance of this distinction was first highlighted and analyzed in Bebchuk, supra note 2, 
at 1825-29.  The differences between the IPO stage and the mid-stream stage were subsequently much 
discussed and debated in the Columbia Law Review symposium on contractual freedom in corporate law. 
See Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 1399-1404 (discussing the problem of contractual freedom with respect to 
midstream companies); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1416, 1442-44 (1989) (same); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 




existing companies is especially important, because existing companies wishing to opt out of 
new default arrangements face some impediments that would not arise in the case of future IPOs.  
Whenever a default arrangement that legislators or courts adopt turns out to be inefficient, 
companies going public subsequent to the default arrangement’s adoption will most likely opt 
out of it.  Such opting out of defaults that turn out to be inefficient, however, might not take 
place in existing companies if opting out would be disfavored by management. 
When default rules are adopted, they generally affect many companies already in 
existence.  At the time they went public, these companies did not anticipate the developments 
triggering the adoption of these rules, and they thus did not provide contractual arrangements in 
their charters to govern these developments.  Companies that went public in the 1970s, for 
example, did not anticipate the mid-1980s invention of the poison pill, the changes in director 
liability following the Van Gorkom decision, or the ways in which classified boards would 
interact with poison pills to impede hostile takeovers.
5  When these developments emerged in the 
1980s and 1990s, courts and legislators had to choose default arrangements, recognizing that 
these arrangements would affect the large stock of public companies already in existence. 
Suppose that courts or legislators have to choose between two possible default 
arrangements to govern an issue that has recently emerged.  A natural and widely accepted 
approach is to try to assess which of the two arrangements would be more likely to serve 
shareholder value.
6  Under this approach, when public officials are uncertain which of two 
                                                 
5 See infra Part III.A (reviewing the reform in the director liability in the aftermath of the Van 
Gorkom decision) and Part III.D (analyzing the interaction of classified boards with the poison pill). 
6 As we explain below, throughout the paper we make a fairly conventional assumption that the 
desirable corporate arrangement is the one that maximizes shareholder value.  Although other views exist 
about the desirable goal for corporate law, the goal of enhancing shareholder value view is sufficiently 
important and widely held for it to be worthwhile exploring how default arrangements should be best 




possible arrangements would be value-maximizing, they should resolve which arrangement 
would be more likely, in their judgment, to be the one that, if applied, would maximize 
shareholder value.  This question is equivalent to asking which arrangement fully informed and 
rational shareholders would have most likely chosen had they considered this question.
7  This so-
called “hypothetical bargains” approach seeks to identify what arrangement would have been 
most likely adopted by shareholders had they considered the matter when the company first went 
public.
8  
We argue that, although it seems appealing at first glance, this approach should not be 
followed because it overlooks a fundamental asymmetry in the process of opting-out of default 
rules by existing public corporations.  Under the prevailing rules of corporate law, shareholders 
cannot amend the corporate charter without the cooperation of the board of directors.
9  To be 
                                                 
7  See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 3, at 768 (describing the common view under which content of 
default terms “should be governed by a judgment regarding the terms that firms would select in the 
absence of transaction costs”); FRANK  H. EASTERBROOK  & DANIEL  R. FISCHEL, THE  ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE  LAW  15 (1991) (stating that “[t]he normative thesis of the book is that 
corporate law should contain the terms people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at 
arm’s length for every contingency sufficiently low”); Gordon, supra note 4, at 1593-97 (1989) (applying 
the standard to set the standard of fiduciary duties for directors). 
8 The hypothetical bargains approach is the predominant theory of contractual interpretation. See 
generally David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991). Recently, it has been endorsed also in the context of statutory interpretation. 
See Einar Elhauge, Preference Estimating Statutory Defaults (Working Paper, 2001); Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 85 (2000) (describing some canons of statutory interpretation 
as “majoritarian default rules – attempts to capture what Congress would have said had it spoken to the 
question”). 
Some work on default rules in contract has focused on how default rules might be best designed 
to induce an efficient transfer of information from some parties to others. See  Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 
(1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to 
Reveal Information, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1615 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information 
and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
284 (1991) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Shavell, Information and Liability]. See also Ayres, supra note 3, at 
1397-400 (applying this “information-forcing” approach to the design of default rules for corporate law). 
In our view, such considerations are not very important for the choice of default rules for existing 
companies. 




sure, a charter amendment requires a vote of shareholder approval.  Such votes, however, take 
place only on amendments initiated by management.  Management thus has an effective veto 
power over charter amendments.  As a result, for any level of shareholder support, corporations 
are much more likely to adopt amendments management favors than amendments management 
disfavors.  
This asymmetry produces a difference in the prospects of reversal by corporations 
between those default rules that management favors—because they restrict managers less than 
their alternative—and those alternative, more restrictive rules.  Restrictive default rules that are 
adopted by public officials, but that turn out to be inefficient and thus disfavored by 
shareholders, will be more likely to be reversed than non-restrictive default rules that turn out to 
be inefficient.  Put differently, undesirable non-restrictive default rules are more likely to persist 
if initially adopted than undesirable restrictive default rules.  
An optimal approach to designing default rules must take this asymmetry into account.  If 
public officials facing a choice between two or more defaults seek to maximize the chances that 
the value-maximizing arrangement would ultimately govern, the best way is not necessarily to 
choose the arrangement that they estimate to be the one most likely to be value-maximizing.  
Rather, when public officials face significant uncertainty about which choice would be value-
maximizing, a better strategy often would be to make their choice in a way designed to facilitate 
change in the event that the chosen default arrangement does not turn out to be the one 
shareholders favor.   
Our  reversible default approach for choosing default rules of corporate law can be 
summarized as follows:  Whenever public officials face a choice between two default 




the side of the more restrictive arrangement would carry with it a certain important advantage.   
If the restrictive arrangement is chosen, and then turns out to be inefficient, relatively little will 
be lost because both shareholders and managers will support a charter amendment opting out of 
this inefficient arrangement.  In contrast, when opting out requires a charter amendment, if the 
non-restrictive arrangement is chosen and then turns out to be inefficient, it might often persist 
despite its inefficiency.  Alternatively, public officials can adopt the more restrictive arrangement 
as a default, but only if shareholders can unilaterally opt out via a bylaws amendment. 
The theory we develop in this paper has important implications for the many instances in 
which courts and legislatures must adopt default rules to govern situations that were largely 
unanticipated at the time most of the affected companies went public.  We apply our reversible 
default approach to evaluate several important cases from the last two decades in which public 
officials have adopted default rules. 
We first examine the approach followed by state legislators in the aftermath of the Van 
Gorkom case.
10  This case, which was regarded as a sign of heightened scrutiny of director 
actions, and the D & O insurance crisis, led Delaware and other states to expand the menu of 
choices available to public companies to include the option of limited monetary liability for 
directors. This change in the rules governing director liability could have been effected in two 
ways: by adopting the new “lenient” arrangement as a default, and allowing companies to opt out 
of it; or by keeping the old “stringent” arrangement as the default, and allowing companies to opt 
out of it to the new lenient arrangement.  Delaware and most other states chose the second path 
and applied the new arrangement only to companies that explicitly adopted it in their charter.  As 
our analysis shows, the path taken by Delaware and those other states was the desirable one.  
                                                 




Had the lenient arrangement been set as default, shareholders might well have been unable to 
amend the charter to opt out of it even if it turned out that they disfavored it. 
We next examine the ”bidder-restriction” antitakeover statutes that limit the behavior of a 
successful bidder after a hostile takeover.  Most states adopting these statutes did not wish to 
impose a mandatory arrangement on companies.  These states, however, adopted the regime that 
restricts bidders as a default arrangement, requiring opting out for companies to be governed by a 
regime that is less restrictive of takeovers.  From the perspective of the reversible defaults 
approach, this choice of the antitakeover regime as the default is highly problematic. Rules 
restricting hostile takeovers clearly favor management—they impede a hostile bidder’s ability to 
take over and replace the board.  Thus, management might not initiate charter amendments 
opting out of bidder-restriction defaults even if these defaults turn out to be disfavored by 
shareholders.  Accordingly, the desirable route was either to require opting into the antitakeover 
regime by charter amendment or to allow shareholders to opt out of the protective regime by 
amending the bylaws. 
We next examine the default rules governing the adoption of poison pills.  Invented in the 
1980s, the poison pill was a new tool whose use could fundamentally alter the balance of power 
between shareholder and management.
11  After some evolution through judicial decisions and the 
adoption by some states of poison pill endorsement statutes, state law moved toward allowing 
the board to use pills.  When choosing between allowing and disallowing boards’ antitakeover 
use of pills, state corporate law has chosen the regime allowing such use as a default, thus 
requiring a charter provision prohibiting pills to prevent managers from using them.  Again, we 
                                                 
11 To be sure, the introduction of poison pills took advantage of the formal power that managers 
always had—the power to issue securities.  Yet, such use of this managerial power had not been 




view this choice of default as undesirable.  Allowing managers to adopt the pill was clearly the 
arrangement managers favored.  Thus, the desirable route was either to require a charter 
amendment for having a regime permitting poison pills or to provide such a regime as a default 
but then to allow opting out of it via bylaws amendment.  
Finally, we examine the rules governing the powerful antitakeover defenses created by 
combining poison pills with antitakeover charter provisions (ATPs), especially provisions 
establishing a classified board.  A poison pill by itself can hardly impede a hostile bidder whose 
offer is attractive to shareholders. The pill can become a serious impediment, however, when 
combined with ATPs that otherwise impede winning a proxy contest for control of the board.  
Although including a provision establishing a classified board in a charter could not have 
occurred without shareholders’ explicit or implicit consent, whether the antitakeover use of such 
a provision can be viewed as grounded in shareholder consent critically depends on when the 
company adopted the provision.  Shareholders of companies that adopted classified boards prior 
to the late 1980’s could not have reasonably anticipated the developments in poison pill doctrine 
that made a combination of classified board with a poison pill an extremely powerful 
antitakeover device.  Thus, shareholders of these companies found themselves in the 1990s 
governed by an arrangement whose far-reaching antitakeover consequences they could not have 
anticipated the company adopted its ATPs.   
Under the reversible defaults approach, it would be desirable to have this powerful 
antitakeover device in place only when shareholders have genuinely opted into having it. 
Although state law on this subject has thus far not evolved in this way, we put forward two ways 
in which the reversible defaults approach could be implemented going forward. The first 




prior to 1990 and not ratified subsequently from using such board classification to create strong 
antitakeover defenses. Managers of such companies should not be allowed to maintain a pill to 
block a bid after losing an election in which the bid was the main issue. An alternative approach 
would be to allow shareholders of such companies to initiate and adopt bylaw amendments 
limiting the ability of the board to adopt a poison pill or to maintain it following a defeat in such 
an election. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Part II highlights the importance of 
default rules for corporate law, and makes the case for adopting the reversible default approach.  
Part III applies the reversible default approach to evaluate several major developments of 
corporate law in the past two decades.  Finally, Part IV concludes. 
 
II. A THEORY OF OPTIMAL CORPORATE DEFAULTS 
This Part presents the case for the reversible defaults approach in choosing corporate-law 
defaults.  Section A discusses the need for corporate law defaults.  Section B outlines the choice 
of default arrangements for companies going public in the future.  Section C considers the choice 
of default rules for existing public companies. 
 
A.  Defaults in a Changing World 
1.  The Evolution of Corporate Law  
This paper focuses on the legal regulation of publicly traded companies, especially ones 





12  As we shall see, the agency problem underlying the public corporation affects 
the ability of the public corporation to opt out of inefficient default arrangements.
13   
We should also note that our focus is on those issues that corporate law has chosen to 
subject to contractual freedom.  Some aspects of corporate governance are regulated in a 
mandatory fashion,
14 and there has been an extensive debate as to the scope of issues that should 
be governed by mandatory rules.
15  There is no dispute, however, that a substantial part (if not 
all) of corporate governance should be regulated in an enabling manner, allowing companies to 
choose the arrangement that will govern them.  
Even for arrangements that companies are free to shape, however, corporate law plays the 
important role of providing defaults.  Corporate charters, the main vehicle through which 
companies specify the arrangements that will govern them, are inevitably incomplete, requiring 
corporate law to “fill the gaps.”  There are two reasons for gaps in corporate charters.  First, 
transaction costs make it costly to specify an arrangement for each and every issue, even for ones 
that can be anticipated to arise when the charter is adopted.  Second, and for our purposes more 
importantly, initial charters will inevitably fail to address novel contingencies that drafters did 
                                                 
12 For an analysis of additional implications of the distinction between close and publicly held 
corporations, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986).  
13 On the agency problem associated with the inherent conflict interest between managers and 
shareholders of public companies, see Michael Jensen and William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Eugene F. 
Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 327 (1983). 
14 Two prominent examples are insider trading and the duty of loyalty of corporate directors. See 
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983) 
(analyzing the mandatory nature of the prohibition on insider trading); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate 
Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1271-78 (1999) (justifying the mandatory nature of the 
duty of loyalty). 
15  See generally Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of 
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhouser eds., 1985); John 
C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of 




not anticipate at the time of their adoption.  Corporate law is thus required to provide default 
arrangements to address these new contingencies until the time (if ever) that corporations adopt 
charter provisions with respect to them.
16  
Gaps of the second type are of great significance for the corporate law governing publicly 
traded companies.  Such companies are often long-living entities operating in a dynamic and 
ever-changing business environment.  As a consequence, it is likely that contingencies will 
emerge that received little or no attention when companies’ initial charters were adopted. 
Companies that went public in the 1970s or earlier, for example, did not anticipate the invention 
of the poison pill in the 1980s or, more generally, the current dynamics of the takeover market.  
Similarly, such companies also had no reason to anticipate the adoption in the 1980s of an 
enabling approach, and the resulting expanded menu of choices, with respect to director liability 
for duty of care violations.  With respect to companies that went public before the 1970s, 
corporate law in the 1980s and 1990s had to provide defaults for these issues that were clearly 
unanticipated when the companies went public.     
Although we use the language of providing new defaults for novel contingencies, our 
analysis applies also to situations in which a default that is formally in place was clearly not 
chosen with the anticipation of these new contingencies, making it desirable to provide a default 
for these new circumstances.  For example, the Delaware statute has long had a provision 
providing managers with the formal power to design the terms of issued securities, thus 
providing them with the flexibility needed to raise capital effectively.
17  Until the poison pill 
invention, however, it was not anticipated managers could use this formal power not only in 
                                                 
16 On the role of default rules in contracts see generally Charny, supra note 8. 
17 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1991) (granting the board the power to issue securities and 




connection with raising capital but also with the unrelated goal of blocking a hostile bid.  The 
developments in the takeover market, and the accompanying invention of the poison pill, thus 
confronted companies and public officials with a new issue: As long as the corporate charter is 
silent on the issue, should managers be able to use the formal power to issue securities with 
various terms to block a hostile bidder?
18  
 
2.  Defaults and Imperfect Information  
In developing a theory of corporate law defaults, we must proceed using the premise that 
market players and investors in any given company are more likely than public officials to 
identify the superior arrangement for their company.  This assumption is the natural one to make 
considering issues with respect to which corporate law has already made the choice to favor a 
default arrangement over a mandatory arrangement.  Indeed, the informational superiority of 
market participants is the very reason for allowing companies to opt out of certain default 
arrangements provided by public officials. Issues for which pubic officials are likely to know 
better than market participants what the desirable arrangement is should be regulated by a 
mandatory rule and thus should be outside the scope of the theory of corporate law defaults. 
Below we will therefore assume that shareholders know better than public officials what 
arrangement would serve them.   
Not knowing as well as investors which arrangement would be best with respect to the 
considered issues, public officials will have to operate under conditions of imperfect 
                                                 
18  See  discussion  infra Part III.C.  Thus, in our view, the choice of defaults is a time- and 
situation-specific exercise. Given whatever the charter, or the provisions of the relevant corporate statute, 





19  Their uncertainty over the identity of the desirable arrangement with respect to 
any given issue can stem from two distinct sources.  First, even assuming all public companies 
are homogeneous,
20 public officials might be uncertain about the overall effect of a given default 
arrangement on shareholder value.  Second, when public companies differ in the identity of the 
arrangement that would be optimal for them, public officials might be unable to distinguish 
between companies of different type and to match each company with the arrangement best 
fitting it.   
Accordingly, our analysis below applies to two conceptually distinct cases.  Suppose that 
public officials must choose between two default arrangements, A and B, to govern a new 
contingency.  One “pure” scenario to consider involves only the first type of uncertainty.  In this 
scenario, companies are homogeneous and the arrangement that would be best for some would 
be best for all but public officials cannot identify this best arrangement with certainty.  Rather, 
they estimate by 1-P the likelihood that A is the more efficient arrangement, and by P the 
likelihood that B is the more efficient arrangement. 
A second “pure” scenario to consider is one in which only the second type of uncertainty 
exists.  Suppose that companies are heterogeneous and that public officials know that A is the 
efficient arrangement for companies of type I, and that B is the efficient arrangement for 
companies of type II.  They also know that companies of type I constitute a fraction α of all 
companies, and that companies of type II accordingly constitute a fraction 1-α of companies.  
                                                 
19 See also Vermeule, supra note 8, at 100 (describing statutory interpretation as “an exercise in 
decisionmaking under conditions of severe empirical uncertainty”).   
20 Note that by homogeneous all we mean is homogeneous with respect to the likely effect of the 
particular default arrangement on the value of the company’s shares. Companies can be heterogeneous 




Public officials, however, lack information about any given company’s type and thus cannot 
apply to each group of companies the arrangement, A or B, that best fits it.  
For simplicity of presentation, our analysis below will mostly refer to the first scenario in 
which companies are homogeneous and public officials lack information about which 
arrangement would overall work best. It should be clear, however, that our analysis equally 
applies to the second “pure” scenario or to cases in which public officials have the two types of 
uncertainty.   
It will be useful to consider a concrete example.  Suppose that public officials have to 
choose between A and B and believe that the efficient arrangement would increase total 
shareholder value by 100 compared with the less efficient arrangement.  They are not sure, 
however, which arrangement is better.  Rather, they estimate that there is a likelihood of 55% 
that A is the better arrangement and a likelihood of only 45% that B is the better one.  What 
strategy can the public officials employ to make it most likely that companies will be governed 
by the best arrangement?   
Under the conventional hypothetical-bargains approach, public officials should adopt 
arrangement A in this example.  Assuming that the arrangement the officials choose is going to 
remain and will govern, choosing A will produce a probability of 55% of getting it right, whereas 
choosing B will produce a probability of 45% of such an outcome.  As we shall explain below, 
however, this approach would not necessarily be the correct one once we take into account the 





B.   Optimal Defaults for Future IPOs 
The mechanisms for opting out of default arrangements by future IPOs differ from the 
mechanisms for opting out by existing companies.  As a result, the optimal default arrangement 
might not be identical for both types of companies.  It will be useful to start by examining the 
choice of defaults for future IPOs.  
At the IPO stage, the provisions of the charter are chosen by the party, or parties, (the 
“founder”) that takes the company public.  While these charter provisions are not the product of 
actual bargaining between the founder and public investors, the interests of public investors are 
taken into account through the effect of charter provisions on share prices.  Assuming investors 
are aware of the effect that charter provisions will have on shareholder value, the price that they 
will be willing to pay for the company’s shares will reflect the effect of charter provisions on 
share value.  Thus, for charter provisions priced accurately by the market, the founder will 
internalize the interests of public shareholders and adopt the most efficient charter provisions.
21 
Accordingly, assuming that a chosen default will apply only to future IPOs, the optimal 
approach for choosing it is relatively straightforward.  If opting into any of the considered 
candidates for the default arrangement is equally easy, it will be desirable to apply the 
hypothetical bargains approach and choose the arrangement most likely to be efficient.  In our 
example, public officials should choose arrangement A because it is the arrangement that has the 
higher likelihood —fifty-five percent—of maximizing shareholder value.   
Following the hypothetical bargains approach here, so the argument goes, would increase 
the likelihood of getting to the desirable arrangement without opting out and thus minimize the 
                                                 
21 See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 4, at 1421 (taking the view that entrepreneurs will 
adopt charter provisions that are most likely to maximize expected value); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 




expected transaction costs that might be incurred.  In the case of homogenous companies and 
uncertainty about whether A or B would be generally best, choosing A would produce a 
likelihood of 55% that no company will need to opt out and thus no companies will incur 
transaction costs.  In the case in which companies are assumed to be heterogeneous, choosing A 
again would be optimal; such a choice would require only 45% of the companies to opt out (and 
incur transaction costs) to get their desired arrangement.  In contrast, choosing B would require 
55% of the companies to opt out (and incur transaction costs) to get their desired arrangement. 
Before concluding the discussion of future IPOs, however, it should be stressed that this 
set of companies is the one with respect to which the choice of default is relatively unimportant. 
Although choosing A over B for these companies would be the right thing to do if a separate 
default were to be set for future IPOs, the practical significance of the choice between A and B 
would be relatively small.  As explained above, founders taking their companies public have 
strong incentives to have the best arrangements governing the company and thus to do whatever 
opting out would be necessary for having these arrangements.  Thus, the adverse consequences 
of undesirable defaults would largely not involve the best arrangement not governing companies 
but rather having somewhat large transaction costs incurred in the designing of initial charters.  
In contrast, in the case of existing companies to which we now turn, undesirable arrangements 
that are chosen as default might sometimes “stick.” 
 
C.  Optimal Defaults for Existing Companies 
At any given point of time in which a default is chosen, a large stock of existing companies 
will be in existence and will be affected by the choice.  As we shall show, the considerations 




defaults with respect to future IPOs.  In theory, public officials might sometimes consider 
choosing different defaults for existing companies and for companies that will go public in the 
future.  Practical reasons, however, might call for the use of a single default.  Assuming this is 
the case, we wish to start by pointing out that the considerations relevant for the case of existing 
companies should play a central role in this choice.  
 
1.  The Central Role of Existing Companies for Default Design 
In our view, choosing the right default for existing companies is substantially more 
important that getting the right default for future IPOs.  To start with, the stock of existing 
publicly traded companies at any given point in time is quite large.  Thus, when a new rule is 
adopted, it will take many years for the assets governed by companies that go public after the 
rule’s adoption to exceed the assets governed by companies that went public prior to the rule’s 
adoption.  Consider, for example, the arrangement, that the Delaware courts endorsed in 1989, 
that turns the combination of classified boards and poison pills into a powerful antitakeover 
device.
22  Even today, more than ten years after the effective adoption of this arrangement, a 
substantial majority of companies governed by classified boards went public before the 
arrangement first crystallized.
23  
Furthermore, the expected cost from choosing an undesirable default is likely to be lower 
for future IPOs than for existing companies.  For future IPOs, the damage from choosing 
incorrectly is always bounded by the transaction costs of opting out in their initial charters.  As 
these transaction costs are relatively low, a chosen default arrangement that would be 
                                                 
22 For a discussion of the developments in Delaware that led to the emergence of this powerful 
antitakeover device, see infra Part III.D. 




substantially inferior to alternative arrangements would never actually govern future IPOs.  If the 
chosen default arrangement is indeed so inferior, its costs would far exceed the transaction costs 
of opting out, and we can expect future IPOs to opt out of this default. 
To state matters in a more formal way, let the cost of opting out in the initial charter by a 
company going public in the future be CF, and let the inefficiency costs the inferior arrangement 
produces be ∆V.  The costs produced by choosing the inferior arrangement as a default will 
never exceed the smaller of CF and ∆V.  In fact, because CF can be hardly expected to be large 
relative to the amounts at stake, in the case of future IPOs, inferior default arrangements would 
largely be replaced.   
In contrast, in the case of existing companies, the expected costs from choosing an 
undesirable arrangement as a default might sometimes be quite large and are not at all generally 
bounded by the transaction costs involved in opting out.  In the case of existing companies, an 
undesirable default might not be reversed when managers favor it even if its adverse effects on 
shareholder value are substantial.   
 
2.  The Criterion for Choosing the Criterion 
Given that the choice of defaults for existing companies is important, let us start 
examining this choice by considering a meta-question—what criterion should be used to 
determine the desirable approach for public officials to follow in choosing default arrangements 
for such companies?
24  The desirable criterion, we argue, calls for the adoption of an approach 
that would minimize the expected costs of deviations from the optimal corporate arrangements.   
                                                 




Such a meta-criterion is the one that rational and fully informed parties to the corporate 
contract would have chosen ex ante had they considered the criterion that should guide public 
officials in setting defaults.  When companies are formed, the corporate contract—which consists 
of the terms supplied by corporate law and the terms supplied by the parties in the charter and in 
the bylaws—can be viewed as also including the mechanism that would determine how the 
substantive arrangements governing the company might change over time.  Such changes can 
arise from changes in the charter and bylaw provisions and from the adoption of new legal 
defaults and any additional terms provided by future choices of defaults.   
Ex ante, rational and informed parties would want public officials to fill gaps in a way 
that would minimize the expected costs of deviations from the value-maximizing arrangement.  
In the case of existing companies, however, such approach would not be implemented by 
officials choosing the arrangement that they view as most likely to be value-maximizing.  It 
would instead, as explained below, be implemented by following the reversible default approach.  
 
3.  Charter Amendments and the Mid-Stream Problem 
The case for the reversible defaults approach is rooted in the presence of asymmetry between 
the reversibility of defaults that management favors and disfavors.  Our analysis takes as given 
the prevailing principles of corporate law concerning the power of managers in corporate 
decision-making in general and in charter amendments in particular.
25  We appreciate that these 
principles are not an inevitable feature of corporate law, and one of us questions them in a 
                                                 





26  These principles are long standing and widely accepted, however, and an 
inquiry taking them as given might thus be worthwhile.   
On most important issues, corporate law requires companies wishing to opt out of a default 
arrangement to do so by amending their charters. Charter amendments, in turn, require 
shareholder approval by a majority of the outstanding stocks. Shareholders can only act, 
however, on the basis of proposals put forward by the board of directors.
27  Shareholders cannot 
ever initiate charter amendment.  The board thus enjoys a veto power over such amendments.  
This veto power of the board produces an asymmetry between arrangements favored by 
management and arrangements disfavored by management. Value-decreasing default 
arrangements that management disfavors would be presumably reversed.  Shareholders would 
support a move to a value-increasing arrangement and managers would be more than happy in 
this case to initiate a charter amendment.   
In contrast, value-decreasing default arrangements that management favors might well 
persist.  Managers might well not initiate a charter amendment to move away from a default that 
favors them.  To be sure, we do not claim that a charter amendment that management disfavors 
would never pass.  When the matter is sufficiently important to shareholders, and if shareholders 
can exert sufficient pressure on management, such pressure can lead management to agree to 
propose a charter amendment that does no directly favor managers.
28  For example, when 
Pennsylvania enacted an antitakeover statute that was widely perceived as extreme and 
excessive, pressure from institutional investors led the majority of Pennsylvania companies’ 
                                                 
26  See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Allocation of Power between Managers and Shareholders, 
(Working Paper, 2001). 
27 See supra note 25. 
28See, e.g.,  David Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001) 




boards to opt out of this arrangement.
29  For our purposes, what is critical is only that there are 
impediments to reversing a default arrangement favored by managers and that such an 
arrangement thus might well not be reversed even if the arrangement is value-decreasing and the 
transaction costs of changing it are small.  The problem is that default arrangements favoring 
managers are likely to “stick.”  
 
4.  Optimal Defaults When Opting Out Requires a Charter Amendment 
The asymmetry between the reversibility of defaults that are and are not favored by managers 
leads to the reversible default approach.  Under this approach, whenever there is uncertainty over 
the identity of the value-maximizing arrangement, a preference should generally be given to the 
alternative that is more restrictive of managers.  This restrictive alternative would be reversed if 
it turns out to be value-decreasing, whereas the alternative favored by managers would remain in 
place if chosen as default even if it turned out to be value-decreasing.
30 
                                                 
29 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 68 (1993); Samuel H. 
Szewczyk & George P. Tsetsekos, State Intervention in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of 
Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 3,18 (1992). 
30 It is worth noting how our argument concerning the tendency of certain default arrangements to 
persist despite their inefficiency is different from similar arguments made in the behavioral literature.  
The behavioral literature suggests that the choice of default rules matters due to the “status quo” bias. See 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1111-13 (2000) (arguing that theories of 
contractual defaults should be revisited in light of the tendency of parties not to contract around default 
provisions); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
608 (1998) (reporting experimental evidence indicating that parties might decline to contract around 
default provisions due to the “status quo” bias); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract 
Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998) 
(same). Our thesis, in contrast, is that how sticky the status quo will be will depend on the nature of the 







The reversible default approach can be stated in formal terms as follows.  As before, let 
us denote the two possible defaults by A and B, with A being the arrangement less restrictive of 
managers.  Similarly, let ∆V denote the reduction in shareholder value that the inferior 
arrangement would produce if it were to govern, and let CE denote the transaction cost of opting 
out.  In this case, if A were to be chosen as a default, and if A turned out to be the value-
decreasing arrangement (which has a probability P of occurring), the arrangement A would stick 
and produce a loss of ∆V.  Thus, the expected cost of choosing A is P * ∆V.  In contrast, if B 
were to be chosen as a default, and if B turned out to be the value-decreasing arrangement 
(which has a likelihood 1-P of occurring), the managers would initiate an opt-out amendment 
(assuming that ∆V exceeds CE) and the transaction costs of CE would be incurred.  Thus, the 
expected cost of choosing B as a default would be (1-P) * (1 – P) x CE < P x ∆V.  Thus, under 
the reversible default approach, B, the arrangement more restrictive of managers, should be 
chosen as long as 
 
(1 – P) x CE < P x ∆V, 
or, equivalently, as long as 
P ≥ CE /(CE + ∆V). 
 
Because CE is likely to be much smaller than ∆V, the value of the right hand side of this 
condition – which is the threshold likelihood of B being the value-decreasing arrangement that 
would be sufficient to call for B to be chosen under the reversible defaults approach -- can fall 
substantially below ½.  The cost of choosing B when the value-increasing arrangement is A is 




A when the value-increasing arrangement is B is the cost ∆V of being “stuck” with the value-
decreasing arrangement.  For this reason, the expected costs of choosing B can be smaller than 
those of choosing A even if P is smaller than ½. 
Note that the larger the cost ∆V of having the value-decreasing arrangement govern the 
company, the smaller the level of doubt needed to make it desirable to err in favor of choosing 
the arrangement that is more restrictive of management even if it does not appear to be the one 
most likely to be value-maximizing.  Thus, the presumption in favor of the arrangement more 
restrictive of managers is especially strong for corporate issues that are important and likely to 
have a significant effect on shareholder value.  For example, the regulation of corporate directors 
and the fiduciary duties of managers, two issues that Part III will discuss in detail, are likely to 
affect shareholder value significantly and thus warrant a strong presumption against the choice 
less restrictive of managers.  
Of course, the reversible defaults approach does not always call for choosing B.  Having 
a presumption against A, the arrangement less restrictive of managers, does not imply that A 
could not be chosen.  The presumption is not absolute.  If P is sufficiently small, which would be 
the case when public officials are sufficiently confident that A would be the value-maximizing 
arrangement, then it will be desirable to choose A.  A very small P implies that little weight 
should be given to the concern of being stuck with a value-decreasing arrangement. 
It will be useful to illustrate the argument with the numerical example used earlier where 
public officials attach a likelihood of 55% to A being the value-increasing arrangement and a 
likelihood of 45% to B being the value-increasing arrangement.  Suppose that the cost of having 
the value-decreasing arrangement govern the company is 100 and that the transaction costs of 




approach in this case calls for adopting A.  But the reversible defaults approach comes out 
differently. 
If arrangement A is adopted and turns out to be inferior (which has a likelihood of only 
45% of occurring), it will not be replaced with arrangement B and the resulting cost will be 100.  
Thus, the expected cost of choosing arrangement A will be 0.45 x 100 = 45.  In contrast, if 
arrangement B is adopted and turns out to be inferior, the cost that will result will be only 10.  
Thus, the expected cost of choosing arrangement B is 0.55 x 10 = 5.5, and it would be desirable 
to adopt arrangement B as a default.  In fact, in this example, using the condition derived earlier, 
arrangement B should be chosen as long as the probability attached to the possibility that it 
would be value-maximizing is at least 10/(10+100) = 9%.  
 
5.  Optimal Defaults When Opting Out Requires a Bylaws Amendment 
Our discussion thus far has focused on the choice of default arrangements under the 
assumption that opting out of the chosen default requires a charter amendment. Although 
important default arrangements usually require charter amendments for opting out, some default 
arrangements may be reversed by amendments to the corporate bylaws.
31  Unlike charter 
amendments, bylaw amendments can be initiated by shareholders and do not require board 
approval.
32 
When opting out can be done by amending the bylaws, the asymmetry that we analyzed 
between arrangements that favored and disfavored by managers does not arise.  This suggests 
                                                 
31  See infra Part III.B.  Our discussion in this section assumes that no limits (such as those 
established by supermajority requirements) are imposed on shareholder ability to amend the bylaws to opt 
out of default arrangements. On the implications of imposing such requirements on opting out by 
amending the bylaws, see our discussion infra Part III.B. 
32 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 109(a) (1991) (granting the power to adopt, amend or repeal 




that the choice of defaults reversible only by charter amendments should be approached 
differently from the choice of defaults reversible also by bylaw amendments. 
Assuming that opting out in either direction can be done by amendments to the corporate 
bylaws, there is no asymmetry between arrangements that managers favor and do not favor in 
terms of the costs arising from choosing a default that turns out to be value-decreasing. In our 
example, whether A or B is chosen, the power of shareholders to opt out will ensure that the 
costs of a choice that turns out to be value-decreasing would not exceed the transaction costs of 
opting out CE.  Accordingly, in such a case, B should be chosen if and only if P is estimated to 
exceed ½ -- the same condition as is used under the hypothetical contracting approach.   
Thus, under the reversible defaults approach, public officials can also decline to use the 
presumption in favor of the arrangement more restrictive of managers, and choose, instead, 
whichever arrangement they deem most likely to be value-enhancing, provided that they allow 
opting out by amending the bylaws.  This way public officials would also ensure that, if the 
chosen default turned out to be value decreasing, shareholders would be able to reverse it easily 
and not be stuck with a value-decreasing arrangement.   
 
III. APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
We have argued that courts and legislators should base default rules for corporate law on 
the reversible defaults approach.  We now turn to evaluate, in light of our proposed approach, 
several important default arrangements that courts and legislators have chosen in the last two 
decades.  Section A examines the introduction of charter provisions limiting the liability of 
directors.  Section B evaluates state antitakeover legislation.  Section C considers the 




A.  Default Rules for Director Liability  
For many years, the fiduciary duties imposed on corporate directors have been a 
mandatory component of state corporate law.
33  In the mid-1980s, however, many states decided 
to adopt an enabling approach to this issue and grant public companies some choice regarding 
the scope of director liability.  This change was motivated by the rise in D&O insurance premia 
in the 1980’s, which in turn was partially attributed to the increase in the rate and success of 
shareholder litigation against directors.
34  This D&O insurance “crisis” was exacerbated by the 
Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, which signaled greater willingness 
by courts to find violations of directors’ duty of care. All this led to a widespread concern that 
companies might be unable to attract qualified individuals to serve on their boards of directors.
35  
To alleviate these concerns, Delaware, followed by a majority of states,
36 decided to 
make it possible for companies to have limited liability for their directors’ duty of care 
violations.  Under this enabling approach, companies have contractual freedom to choose 
between: (i) eliminating the personal monetary liability of their directors for duty of care 
violations, and (ii) having their directors personally liable for such violations.  Below, we take 
                                                 
33 Both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty were mandatory. See Eisenberg, supra note 14 
(highlighting the mandatory nature of the duty of loyalty); R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, 
Commentary From the Bar: Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 
12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 10-11 (1987) (emphasizing that statutory amendments were required to allow 
companies to limit their directors’ liability for breaching the duty of care). 
34 See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 
EMORY L.J. 1155, 1157-60 (1990) (reviewing the D&O liability insurance crisis and its connection to 
corporate litigation). 
35  See  Balotti & Gentile, supra  note 33, at 9; Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The 
Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1989). 
36 The majority of states amended their statutes to relax the rules governing director liability. See 
Romano, supra note 34, at 1160 (noting that “[w]ithin two years, forty-one states, including those with 
the largest public corporations, amended their corporation statutes to reduce directors’ liability 




the adoption of this larger menu as given, and focus only on the choice of the default for existing 
companies.
37   
Having decided to subject the issue to contractual freedom, Delaware had to determine 
which arrangement would serve as the default.  Specifically, Delaware faced a choice between at 
least two alternative regimes.  One possible approach was to adopt an opt-in regime; under this 
regime, the old, “strict ” arrangement would serve as the default, and companies wishing to limit 
director liability would have to opt out to this effect by amending their charter.  An alternative 
approach was to adopt an opt-out regime; under this regime, the new, “lenient” arrangement 
would serve as the default, and companies wishing to have personal liability for duty of care 
violations would have to opt out via a charter amendment.   
Delaware, and most of the other states that introduced the option of limiting director 
liability,
38 followed the first approach and adopted an opt-in regime.  Section 102(b)(7) of the 
Delaware statute permits companies to include in their charter a provision abolishing the 
directors’ monetary liability for duty of care violations.
39  As to companies whose charter does 
not include a provision limiting directors’ liability, their directors face full personal liability for 
duty of care violations.  In contrast, some states, such as Ohio,
40 followed an opt-out approach 
                                                 
37 Several states chose to limit managerial liability in a mandatory fashion. Indiana, for example, 
adopted a mandatory provision changing the basis of liability for breaching the duty of care from gross 
negligence to willfulness or recklessness. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 2001); 
Romano, supra note 34, at 1160 (interpreting the Indiana provision as a mandatory one). Our analysis, 
focusing on the optimal approach to designing default rules, does not apply to the legislation of these 
states.  
38 By 1990, approximately 30 states adopted the Delaware model. See Committee on Corporate 
Laws, Changes in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act-Amendment Pertaining to the Liability of 
Directors, 45 BUS. LAW. 695, 696 (1990).  Only a handful of companies adopted the opt-in model. See 
id.at 697. 
39 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991). 
40 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (West Supp. 2000) (abolishing, unless the 
articles specifically state otherwise, director monetary liability for acts undertaken not with intent to cause 




under which directors do not have personal liability for duty of care violations unless there are 
charter provisions to the contrary.  
Evaluating the issue from the perspective of the reversible defaults approach, the opt-in 
route followed by Delaware and most other states allowing for limits on liability was indeed the 
desirable one. To see this, consider first the consequences of adopting an opt-out regime 
assuming the default rule this regime imposes – the lenient arrangement of no personal liability 
for duty of care violations - turns out to be the one shareholders disfavor.  In such a regime, even 
though shareholders would clearly support a charter amendment opting-out into the stringent 
arrangement, the board might well not initiate such an amendment.  Though, by hypothesis, such 
an amendment would increase shareholder value, directors will weigh their stake in the expected 
increased value of the corporation against the increase in their expected liability costs.   
Accordingly, since directors might want to keep the no-liability arrangement, the value-
enhancing arrangement might not be adopted.  
Consider in turn the consequences of an opting-in regime under which a no-liability 
arrangement is allowed but only if the charter includes a provision to this effect.  Under this 
regime, whenever the default arrangement of director liability is disfavored by shareholders as 
compared with the no-liability arrangement, the latter can be expected to be adopted.   
Shareholders would support a charter amendment because, by hypothesis, this amendment would 
increase the value of their shares.  Directors would eagerly support this amendment because it 
not only would increase share value, but also would (perhaps even more importantly for them) 
reduce their liability exposure.   
 Indeed, the large number of companies in Delaware and in other states that in fact chose 




can be adopted when managers favor the opting out of the default arrangement.
41  T h e  
asymmetry in the ease with which the two alternative defaults could be reversed justifies the use 
of the opt-in route because, when states adopted the considered legislation, lawmakers could not 
have been confident that abolishing duty-of-care liability would be generally value-enhancing for 
corporations.  Given this uncertainty, the opt-in regime Delaware adopted was indeed the route 
that was desirable according to the reversible defaults approach. 
It might be argued that the decisions by the majority of companies to limit the duty-of-
care liability of their directors cast serious doubts on the wisdom of states’ past decisions to 
adopt opt-in regimes.  After all, so the argument goes, the large number of companies that chose 
to have a regime limiting duty-of-care liability indicates that such a regime should have been 
viewed as clearly the desirable one.  We find this argument, however, to be unpersuasive.   
To begin, not all companies abolished their directors’ liability, and states’ adoption of an 
opt-in regime is what made it possible to maintain directors’ liability in those companies whose 
shareholders favored such an arrangement.  Furthermore, in evaluating the wisdom of adopting 
an opt-in regime, what matters is not which arrangement is viewed as best in hindsight.  Rather, 
the important question is whether state legislators, at the time that they had to decide which 
default to choose, could have identified with certainty one arrangement as the value-maximizing 
one for all, or almost all, companies.  Thus, as long as a sufficient level of such uncertainty 
                                                 
41  See Romano, supra  note 34, at 1160-61 (reporting that over 90 percent of her sample of 
Delaware companies adopted exculpatory provisions). See also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not 
Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2000) (“[O]ut of one hundred ‘Fortune 500’ companies, 
ninety-eight of the stock corporations that incorporated in jurisdictions allowing for exculpatory charter 
provisions have adopted such provisions.”). We are unaware of empirical studies specifically focusing on 
the number of mid-stream companies that amended their charter to limit the liability of their directors for 




existed when states chose the default arrangement, adopting an opt-in regime indeed was the 
desirable route to follow according to the reversible defaults approach.
42 
 
B.  State Antitakeover Statutes 
We now turn to examine the choices of default arrangements involved in state 
antitakeover legislation.  By 2000, forty-two states had enacted some form of statute regulating 
takeover bidders.
43  We focus in this Section on the so-called “bidder-restriction” statutes, which 
impose various restrictions on bidders.  Examples of bidder-restriction legislation include 
“business combination” statutes, which prohibit successful bidders from engaging in certain 
business combinations with an acquired company, and “control share acquisition” statutes which 
require a shareholder vote approving the “acquisition of control” by the bidder.
44   
States have generally elected to leave companies with some contractual freedom with 
respect to the takeover regime governing them.  The vast majority of bidder-restriction statutes 
allow companies to opt out of the default arrangement they set.
45  We do not intend in this 
Section to question basic justifications for having state antitakeover statutes and, in particular, 
for allowing companies to have a regime substantially restricting takeovers.
46  Rather, we take as 
                                                 
42 For the formal conditions specifying what would be a “sufficient” level of uncertainty for our 
purposes, see our general analysis supra Part II.C.4. 
43 See GRANT A. GARTMAN, STATE TAKEOVER LAWS, App. A-5 (2000).  
44 For a review of the main groups of antitakeover provisions, see JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 1092-97 (5th ed. 2000); GARTMAN, id. 
45 We do not discuss another group of statutes with antitakeover effects–constituency statutes.  
This is because these statutes, apparently enacted to protect the interest of third parties, are mandatory in 
nature. For a comprehensive discussion of these statutes, see Frank J. Garcia, Protecting Nonshareholder 
Interests in the Market for Corporate Control: A Role for State Takeover Statutes, 23 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 507, 526-534 (1990).  
46 For a critique of state antitakeover statutes, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1168, 1174-77 (1999) [hereinafter Bebchuk and Ferrell, Race to Protect Managers]; Lucian Arye 




given the decision by states to offer a menu that includes an option of a regime restricting 
bidders, and we only examine the choice by states of the default arrangement that would apply 
absent a charter provision indicating otherwise.  
Again, states could have followed two alternative routes.  First, states could maintain an 
opt-in regime under which the default arrangement would not impose restrictions on bidders but 
a regime with such restrictions could be introduced by opt-in charter provisions.  Alternatively, 
states could have adopted an opt-out regime under which the default would impose restriction on 
bidders but companies would be allowed to opt out of this regime.    
As in the director liability context, whereas the choice of the default rule did not have a 
substantial and irreversible impact on future IPOs, it was of considerable importance for 
companies already in existence.
47  Furthermore, states could not have been confident that their 
bidder-restriction rules would be value maximizing for all corporations.  In the presence of such 
uncertainty, the reversible defaults approach called not for adopting as default the regime 
restricting bidders and thus favored by managers, but rather for enabling shareholders to opt into 
this regime. 
Consider the consequences of adopting a default rule imposing bidder restrictions 
assuming that these restrictions turn out to be value-reducing because they excessively deter 
bidders.  In such a case, even though shareholders would support a charter amendment opting out 
of these restrictions, the board might well not initiate such an amendment.  Notwithstanding the 
                                                                                                                                                             
REV. 111 (2001) [hereinafter Bebchuk and Ferrell, A New Approach].  The empirical evidence indicates 
that the passage of antitakeover statutes was largely accompanied by either no effect or negative effect on 
shareholder value.  For a survey of this evidence, see Gartman, supra note 43. 
47 Indeed, in many cases states adopted antitakeover provisions to affect pending hostile takeover 
battles. See Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate 
Charters, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 365; GARTMAN, supra note 43, at Massachusetts-4 (attributing the rapid 




default arrangement’s adverse effect on shareholder value, managers might prefer this 
arrangement because it would benefit them by weakening the threat of hostile bids and thereby 
strengthening their hold on control.
48  As a result, bidder-restriction defaults might persist even 
when they turn out to be inefficient. 
In contrast, the alternative default choice, under which state law would not impose a 
regime with bidder restrictions absent a charter provision to this effect, would generally produce 
desirable outcomes even if the chosen default turns out to be inefficient.  In such a case, 
shareholders would support an opt-in amendment and the managers would be more than happy to 
initiate it and bring it for shareholder approval.  Thus, a default without bidder restrictions would 
be replaced readily whenever it turns out to be disfavored by shareholders. 
Given this asymmetry in reversibility between the two alternative defaults, states should 
have adopted opt-in regimes under which the bidder restrictions would prevail only if companies 
adopt charter provisions to this effect.  As an acceptable alternative, states could have adopted as 
default a regime imposing bidder restrictions while enabling companies to opt out of this default 
through bylaw provisions.
49 
States, however, met the challenge of choosing defaults in this area with varying degrees 
of success.  Virtually all states adopting bidder-regulations provisions enacted an opt-out regime, 
that is, they adopted bidder-restriction provisions as the default regime.
50  States differed, 
however, in the procedures they set for opting out.  Several states, including Delaware and New 
                                                 
48 See Lucian Arye, “Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition 
in Corporate Law,”: 105 Harvard Law Review 1435 (1992); Bebchuk and Ferrell, Race to Protect 
Managers, supra note 46; Oren Bargil, Michal Barzuza, and Lucian Bebchuk, “A Model of the Market for 
Corporate Law,” (working paper, 2001), Harvard Law School, available on www.ssrn.org. 
49 See our discussion of bylaw amendments infra Part II.C.5. 
50 For a review of the default rules states adopted and the procedural requirements for opting out, 




York, allow corporations to opt out of their business combinations statutes through bylaw 
provisions supported by a majority of the outstanding shares.
51  As indicated earlier, such an 
arrangement is largely consistent with the reversible defaults approach.
52 
In an action inconsistent with the reversible defaults approach, some other states allow 
companies to opt out also through bylaw provisions, but make opting out in this way difficult by 
imposing tough supermajority requirements.  Connecticut, for example, allows corporations to 
opt out of its business combinations statute by charter or bylaw amendment approved by two-
thirds of the shares not owned by a ten-percent shareholder.
53  Maryland goes further and 
requires, for opting out of its business combinations statute through a bylaw amendment, an 
approval by at least 80 percent of the outstanding shares.
54  Such supermajority requirements 
increase the costs, and reduce the likelihood, of opting out of inefficient default rules without the 
board’ cooperation.  Indeed, given the substantial incidence of non-participation in corporate 
votes,
55 highly demanding supermajority requirements, such as Maryland’s eighty percent of 
                                                 
51 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney Supp. 2001). New 
York introduces an additional constraint. If the bidder holds more than 20% of shares at the time of the 
vote, the opting out must be approved by a majority of outstanding shares not owned by the bidder. There 
is another constraint on the ability to opt out: shareholder opting-out becomes effective only after 18 
months and would not apply to 15% shareholders at the time of the vote.  These constraints are aimed at 
enabling a bidder to bypass the protection the statute grants by acquiring shares and then using them to 
opt out. 
52  But see ROBERTA  ROMANO, THE  GENIUS OF AMERICAN  CORPORATE  LAW, 56-57 (1993) 
(expressing a clear preference for opting-out arrangement over opting-in arrangement even in the absence 
of supermajority requirement due to the collective-action problem characterizing shareholder action). 
53 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.   §§ 33-843 to 33-845 (West 1997). See also OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 1704.01-1704.07 (West 1994) (imposing similar supermajority requirements on charter 
amendments when opting out of its “business combination” statute.) 
54 See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS §§ 3-601 to 3-604 (1999). 
55 See id. These supermajority requirements practically eliminate shareholders’ ability to opt out 
because a significant percentage of shares are not voted in proxy contests. See James Brickley et al. 
Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendment, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 267 (1988) (reporting 
that, in their sample of 288 corporate votes, the mean fraction of shares that were not voted was 13.8%); 




outstanding shares, practically eliminate shareholders’ ability to opt out by amending the bylaws.  
As a consequence, under these supermajority requirements, shareholders do not practically have 
a way of opting out without management consent.
56  
Finally, several states preclude companies from opting out through bylaw amendment 
and allow opting out only through charter provisions.
57  Indeed, some states not only require 
charter amendment for opting out but also impose supermajority requirements on the approval of 
such a charter amendment.
58  With or without a supermajority requirement, the charter 
amendment route does not enable shareholders to opt out without managers’ cooperation. Thus, 
the route taken by these states is also inconsistent with the reversible defaults approach. 
 
C.  The Poison Pill 
  Poison pills consist of stock warrants or rights that, as long as the company has not 
redeemed them, make the acquisition of a control block by a hostile bidder prohibitively 
expensive.
59  The poison pill was invented in the 1980s to assist boards in resisting hostile 
                                                                                                                                                             
ECON. 57 (1993) (reporting that the mean fraction of shares not voted in their sample of 343 proposals 
was 19.45%). 
56 States’ decision to impose supermajority requirements on shareholder opt-out is particularly 
puzzling considering the fact that that many states impose different majority requirements for opting out 
of different antitakeover provisions, without any apparent justification for these different treatments. 
Maryland, for example, which imposes supermajority requirements on the vote to opt out of its business 
combination and fair price statute, imposes no such requirements on the vote to opt out of its control share 
acquisition statute. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS §§ 3-601 to 3-604 and §§ 3-701 to 3-709 
(1999). 
57 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 415-171 to 415-172 (Michie 1997) (opting out through 
charter amendment only).  
58 Kentucky requires a charter amendment supported by 80 percent of the shares entitled to vote.  
See  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.12-200 to 271B.12-230 (Michie 1989); Louisiana imposes an 
identical requirement with respect to its “fair price” statute. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:132-12:134 
(West 1994).  
59 For a description of the common features of a poison pill, see Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 
The Share Purchase Rights Plan, reprinted in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND 




takeovers.  The pill’s inventors took advantage of statutory provisions that gave boards the 
formal power to design and issue securities.
60  While this formal power had been used earlier to 
provide flexibility in the raising of capital, the creators of pills sought to use it for antitakeover 
purposes.  Thus, the question that courts faced was whether such a new use of this formal power 
to create poison pills is consistent with managers’ fiduciary duties or, more generally, with 
managers’ role in the corporation.  
Because the pill was a new tool that corporate planners had not anticipated earlier, public 
officials had to choose a default arrangement to govern it.
61  Given the uncertainty that courts 
and legislators faced on the question of whether poison pills would enhance shareholder value, 
they could have followed two alternative routes.  First, they could have adopted an opt-in regime 
under which companies could use poison pills only if shareholders ratified the pills or approved a 
charter provision allowing such pills. Alternatively, public officials could have chosen an opt-out 
regime, under which the board would be authorized to adopt a pill unless the charter explicitly 
prohibited it from doing so. 
Under the reversible defaults approach, the optimal default arrangement would not allow 
management to adopt a poison pill without shareholder ratification or a charter provision.
62  The 
reasoning underlying our position here is similar to the one used in examining state antitakeover 
                                                                                                                                                             
works, see John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific 
Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV.  271, 287 n.62 (2000). 
60 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157;  Moran v. Household International, 500 A.2d 1346, 1351 
(Del. 1985).  
61 We share the view of Daines and Klausner that, in states that allow the board to adopt poison 
pills, a charter provision disallowing the adoption of a pill would be valid and enforced.  See Robert 
Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 
17 J. LAW ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001). Assuming this is the case, then the choice that courts faced was 
indeed one of the desirable default arrangement. 
62 See also Bebchuk & Ferrell, Race to Protect Managers, supra note46, at 1189-90 (arguing that, 
given the uncertainty over the desirability of poison pills, states should have required management to get 




statutes.  Because the effect of poison pills on shareholder value was uncertain, public officials 
should have taken into account the asymmetry in the ease with which the two alternative defaults 
could be reversed.  Like other rules governing takeovers, rules governing the adoption of poison 
pills have a clear effect on managers’ interests because they affect the likelihood of successful 
hostile takeovers.  Consequently, companies could not have been expected to opt out of a default 
arrangement allowing poison pills even if this arrangement would not serve shareholder value.  
In contrast, under a default arrangement making shareholder consent necessary for pills, 
shareholders could have been expected to give such consent if pills would turn out to serve 
shareholder value. 
State corporate laws, however, have not followed the optimal route.  States have 
generally adopted an opt-out regime under which the default rule allows managers to adopt pills 
without shareholder approval.
63 Moreover, when several state courts ruled that boards lacked the 
power to adopt a pill unilaterally, lawmakers quickly changed state statutes to negate such 
rulings and explicitly provide boards with such power.
64 
Finally, it might be argued that it is inaccurate to view state law as imposing a regime 
with poison pills without providing shareholders with an effective way out.  Shareholders have 
an effective way out, so the argument goes, because they can always overcome a poison pill by 
                                                 
63 Some state statutes explicitly grant their poison pill endorsement provisions a default status. 
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646 (Michie 1999) (subjecting the board power to adopt poison pills to 
contrary provision in the charter); WASH. REV. CODE § 23.B.06.240 (1994) (same). Other statutes do not 
specify whether their poison pill endorsement is mandatory or default. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
156B, § 32A (Law. Co-op. 1996).  We doubt that these silent poison pill endorsement statutes would be 
interpreted as mandatory.  Nevertheless, it should be clear that our analysis applies to these statutes only 
to the extent they adopt default arrangements.  
64 See CHARLES R.T. OAKLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS 844 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that “in each case in which a court has challenged the board’s 
authority to enact a poison pill, the affected state’s legislature has followed with a statute authorizing the 




electing a new board that would dismantle the pill.  However, although a poison pill indeed 
cannot fully block hostile takeovers, this argument does not establish that a regime with pills 
facilitates takeovers to the same extent as a regime without them.  In particular, replacing a board 
via elections might be a costly process that is not a perfect substitute for a straight tender offer.  
Finally, as we now turn to discuss, whereas poison pills by themselves do not create substantial 
antitakeover impediments, they might do so when combined with antitakeover charter provisions 
(“ATPs”).  
D.  Pills with ATPs 
Although they might be costly to overcome, pills cannot by themselves considerably 
impede a bidder whose offer would be attractive to shareholders.  As the board generally has the 
power to redeem a poison pill, a hostile bidder can succeed in its bid by first obtaining control of 
the target’s board and then redeeming the pill to enable the bid to proceed.
65  Having a poison 
pill by itself simply amounts to requiring a hostile bidder to win a proxy contest that would 
essentially serve as a referendum on its offer.  A poison pill can serve as a serious impediment to 
a takeover, however, when a company has one or more ATPs that delay the replacement of 
directors via a proxy contest.  The combination of a pill with such ATPs can impede hostile 
bidders with offers that could be attractive for shareholders.  We focus below on the most 
powerful ATP: the one establishing a classified board.  Our analysis, however, is relevant also to 
other types of ATPs.  
                                                 
65 Efforts to cut off this line of attack by allowing only continuing directors to redeem the pill (so-
called “dead hand” provisions) or delaying redemption for a specified period of time after a change in 
board composition (“no hand” or “slow hand” provisions) were invalidated by the Delaware courts in the 
late 1990s. See Quickturn Design Systems v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (invalidating “no hand” 
pill); Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s arguments for the 




1.  Shareholder Consent for Antitakeover Protections Produced by Classified Boards 
Classified boards provide a powerful antitakeover device because they substantially 
impede a hostile bidder’s ability to gain control of the board and redeem the pill.
66  A company 
with a classified board groups directors into classes (typically three) with each class elected at a 
successive annual meeting.  With an effective classified board,
67 gaining control of the board 
would require winning at least two elections.  Thus, no matter how close to an annual election it 
emerges, a hostile bidder would be unable to gain control without fighting for it for more than 
one year.  This minimum delay of one year in gaining control creates a costly and substantial 
impediment for a hostile takeover.  In addition to the problem of delay, hostile takeovers are also 
impeded by the need, when facing an effective classified board, to win two separate elections for 
the board, one year apart.  
Recognizing that the combination of poison pills and classified boards creates a powerful 
antitakeover defense, it might be still suggested that this use of classified boards is supported by 
shareholder consent.  Classified boards, so the argument goes, require a charter provision, which 
cannot exist without obtaining implicit or explicit shareholder consent.  For such a charter 
provision to exist, it either had to have been included in the initial charter known to public 
investors that subsequently purchased shares in the company, or it had to have been introduced 
as a charter amendment upon approval by a shareholder vote.  As explained below, however, 
                                                 
66 See Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian., The Antitakeover Power of Classified 
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2002).  This study analyzes the 
special antitakeover power of classified boards.  The study also finds that the evidence is consistent with 
this analysis; having an effective classified board is shown to increase substantially the likelihood that a 
target receiving a hostile would remain independent. 
67 By “effective classified board” we mean a classified board that cannot be dismantled through 
the removal of directors without cause or the packing of the board. See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the 
Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 




whether the antitakeover use of classified boards can be viewed as grounded in shareholder 
consent depends on when the classified board was adopted.  
68 
Before the introduction of the poison pill, the classified board was a fairly mild takeover 
defense mechanism.
69  During that period, a classified board could not prevent a bidder from 
acquiring a controlling block, and it was generally believed that the board would resign if a 
bidder were to acquire a controlling block, making an ultimate replacement of the board 
inevitable (though not imminent).  Even after the pill’s introduction and its legal endorsement in 
the Moran decision,
70 its full effect on the defensive power of classified boards did not become 
clear until around 1990.  In a series of decisions between the years 1985 and 1989,
71 Delaware 
courts indicated that they might limit the ability of managers to maintain a pill indefinitely and 
might require managers to redeem a pill once it outlives its usefulness for shareholders.
72  
Classified boards obtained their full antitakeover significance only following the decision of the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount,
73 which transformed what was a qualified right to use 
                                                 
68 This mid-stream problem, resulting from the adoption of charter provisions prior to the 
doctrinal developments that provided them with considerable antitakeover significance, was first 
examined by Bebchuk and Ferrell, Race to Protect Managers, supra note 46, and Bebchuk and Ferrell, A 
New Approach, supra note 46. 
69  See  ROBERT  C. CLARK, CORPORATE  LAW  576    (1986) (listing classified boards among 
takeover defenses but characterizing them as fairly weak). For an extensive analysis of the developments 
in the antitakeover effects of classified board, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., supra  note 65, at 14 
(manuscript).  
70 Moran v. Household International, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (recognizing the power of the 
board to adopt a poison pill). 
71 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (enjoining 
asset lockup and other defensive actions); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 
103 (Del. Ch. 1986) (enjoining defensive recapitalization); City Capital Assocs. v. Iterco Inc., 551 A.2d 
787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that a pill had to be redeemed because its use to resist a non-coercive tender 
offer was not proportionate to any threat posted by the tender offer); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, 
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989) (enjoining management buyout). 
72 During this period, managers were no doubt motivated by the threat of a hostile takeover in 
proposing classified boards.  Shareholders, meanwhile, generally approved classified boards during this 
period because a hostile bidder still had a viable route against a disloyal target board. 




the pill into a seemingly absolute right for managers to “Just Say No” as long as they are in 
office.  Subsequent cases, such as Wallace Computer, have further demonstrated that courts will 
allow incumbents to maintain a pill and resist a hostile bid indefinitely, and that the only way for 
a hostile bidder to succeed is by first winning control of the board.
74  
Indeed, this major transformation in the entrenching power of classified boards had a 
marked effect on institutional investors’ voting practices.  Until the late 1980, institutional 
investors were quite willing to vote in favor of charter amendments classifying the board.  But 
during the 1990s, institutional investors’ support for such amendments vanished, and 
management proposals to classify boards dropped from 90 proposals in 1988 to just nine 
proposals in 1998.
75  In fact, proposals for an advisory resolution calling for a declassification of 
the board have been drawing substantial support among shareholders since the beginning of the 
1990s.
76 
Thus, shareholders who accepted classified boards prior to 1990, either by buying shares 
of companies that already had a classified board or by approving a charter amendment to classify 
the board, did not contemplate the subsequent development of the pill and its consequences for 
the potentially entrenching power of classified boards. This implies that these shareholders 
should not be regarded as having consented to be governed by the strong antitakeover protection 
that can be produced by a combination of a pill and a classified board.  The nature of the default 
                                                 
74 Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995) (holding that the 
business judgment rule protects a target’s board in its “Just Say No” defense against a hostile bid).  See 
also Neil C. Rifkind, Note, Should Uninformed Shareholders Be a Threat Justifying Defensive Action by 
Target Directors in Delaware?: “Just Say No” After Moore v. Wallace, 78 B.U.L. REV. 105 (1998).  
75 See Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, supra note 65, at 57 (September 2001 manuscript).  




rules governing these shareholders is of considerable practical importance since eighty-four 
percent of companies with classified boards adopted them prior to 1990.
77 
 
2.  Applying the Reversible Defaults Approach 
Having seen that the antitakeover implications currently associated with a classified 
board arose from developments in poison pill doctrine that had not been reasonably anticipated 
earlier, we now turn to apply the reversible defaults approach.  Given these developments, what 
approach should have been taken with respect to all the companies that adopted a classified 
board prior to these developments?  
The reversible defaults approach called for the adoption of an opt-in arrangement under 
which the law would have required shareholders’ opting-in for this new and powerful 
antitakeover device to govern them.  Adopting an opt-out arrangement, that is, adopting a regime 
allowing companies to use this device even when such regime did receive a genuine shareholders 
support might lead, for reasons we have discussed, to the persistence of an arrangement 
shareholders disfavor.  State corporate law, however, did follow such an opt-out regime, 
effectively imposing a powerful antitakeover device on shareholders who had not earlier 
anticipated it or consented to it.  The route taken by state corporate law in this matter is thus 
inconsistent with the reversible defaults approach. 
We wish now to outline two ways in which the reversible defaults approach could be 
applied going forward to ensure that shareholders are not subject, without their genuine consent, 
to a powerful antitakeover device.  The first alternative would apply to companies with classified 
                                                 




boards whose managers lost one proxy contest over an acquisition offer.
78  This alternative 
would not allow managers of targets with a classified board to keep blocking an offer after losing 
such a contest unless the classified board was adopted or ratified after 1990.  This approach 
would provide substance to the Delaware Supreme Court’s language in Moran that directors may 
not “arbitrarily reject” an offer made by a hostile bidder.
79  This approach would have the benefit 
of fitting within the existing Delaware case law on defensive tactics. 
The second alternative would allow shareholders to initiate and adopt bylaw 
amendments limiting the board’s ability to adopt a poison pill.  Though not fully equivalent to 
the optimal opt-in arrangement, this approach would grant shareholders, rather than the board, 
the effective ability to opt out of entrenching classified boards.  In cases of companies with 
classified boards, if shareholders were to adopt such a bylaw provision and thereby eliminate the 
potential use of a poison pill, the antitakeover significance of the classified board will return to 
its mild pre-1990 level.  Indeed, a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma recognized 
the power of shareholders to adopt provisions of this type in the bylaws.
80  Although Delaware 
courts have not yet addressed this question, the emerging consensus among practitioners and the 
S.E.C. is that they would be unlikely to uphold shareholder attempts to adopt such provisions.
81  
                                                 
78 This is the proposal made for classified boards by Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, supra 
note 65.  We endorse it here as consistent with the reversible defaults approach. 
79 See Moran v. Household International, 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985). 
80 Int’l  Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999) 
81 See John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder Bylaws: Post-
Quickturn Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1326-27 (2001) (reporting that the Staff of the SEC has 
allowed companies to exclude proposals for such bylaws from company proxy statements under Rule 
14a-8). Coates and Faris rely on the decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in Quickturn Design 
Systems, Inc., v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291-92 (Del. 1998), in which the court struck down a no hand 
pill because it restricted the “board’s power in an area of fundamental importance to the shareholders – 
negotiating a possible sale of the corporation.” See also Charles F. Richards, Jr. & Robert J. Stearn, Jr., 
Shareholder By-laws Requiring Boards of Directors to Dismantle Rights Plans Are Unlikely to Survive 




Our analysis, however, suggests that, at least with respect to companies with pre-1990 classified 
boards, such bylaw provisions could address an important problem. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have developed a reversible defaults approach for the choice of default 
rules as corporate law evolves.  When choosing defaults, we have argued, it is important to take 
into account the asymmetry introduced by management control over charter amendments.  Under 
the proposed approach, public officials should err in favor of choosing defaults that are more 
restrictive with respect to managers.  Following such an approach would make it most likely that 
the value-maximizing arrangement would ultimately govern shareholders.  We have used the 
proposed approach as basis for evaluating some of the main choices that state corporate law has 
made -- some well and some not well -- in the last two decades.  This approach can similarly 
provide a good basis for evaluating and making such choices as corporate law continues to 
evolve, as it must do, in the future. 